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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
REY DE LA CRUZ LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040816-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the trial court's sua sponte order withdrawing defendant's 
guilty pleas to two counts of forgery, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Once the trial court announced sentence, did the court lose jurisdiction 
to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, where the plea withdrawal 
statute provides that any request to withdraw a plea "shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced"? 
Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, If 8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
Similarly, the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f^ 31, 52 P.3d 1210, cert denied, 537 U.S. 1172 
(2003). 
Preservation: The State preserved this claim by arguing, during the hearing on the 
trial court's sua sponte motion, "that there's [no] mechanism at this stage for the 
defendant" to withdraw his plea (R. 103:5). Even if the State's argument did not preserve 
this claim, "[objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be 
urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is never 
waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sua sponte withdrawing 
defendant's guilty pleas, where nothing in the record demonstrates that 
defendant's pleas were unknowing or involuntary? 
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, \ 7, 73 P.3d 985. However, 
whether the trial court applied the appropriate rule of law in reaching that decision is 
reviewed for correctness. Cf State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^  24, 55 P.3d 573. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by the State's objections during the 
hearing on the trial court's motion (R. 103:3, 7). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provision is attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2003). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
In April 1999, defendant presented an invalid social security number and a 
counterfeit residency card in order to secure a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) guaranteed loan on a home (R. 102:7). 
On March 19, 2004, defendant was charged with one count of forgery, a third 
degree felony, and one count of communications fraud, a second degree felony, or in the 
alternative, one count of theft by deception, also a second degree felony (R. 1-6). 
On August 19, 2004, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in 
which the State agreed to amend the communications fraud count to a count of forgery 
and defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of forgery (R. 43-50; R. 102:2). The 
trial court then conducted a plea colloquy with defendant through an interpreter. During 
the colloquy, defendant confirmed that he understood the rights he was waiving by 
entering his pleas, the charges and penalties involved in the pleas, and the factual basis 
for the pleas (R. 102:4-7). Defendant also confirmed that, although the Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel was in English, not 
Spanish, his attorney had "[gone] through [the document] carefully with [him]" (R. 
102:7-8). The trial court accepted defendant's pleas (R. 102:4-9). 
Defendant asked to be sentenced immediately (R. 102:9). His counsel explained, 
"[We'd] ask the Court to sentence him today, and I think that the State joins with me in 
this, basically just to turn the case over or not give him any more time, release him to the 
immigration customs enforcement officials for deportation to Mexico" (R. 102:10). 
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Before announcing sentence, the trial court addressed defendant directly: "If you 
are sentenced today then you are giving up the right to file a request to withdraw this 
guilty plea. Did you discuss that with [counsel]?" (R. 102:11). Defendant responded, 
"Yes," and then confirmed that he wanted to be sentenced immediately (R. 102:11). The 
court further inquired, "You understand, sir, that if you are released to INS, then you are 
prohibited from coming back to this country if they deport you without their permission?" 
(R. 102:11). Defendant again responded, "Yes" (R. 102:11). 
The trial court then sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of zero-to-five 
years at the Utah State Prison, stayed imposition of those terms, placed defendant on 
probation, and authorized his release to the INS (R. 102:12). After also ordering 
restitution, the court announced, "We'll be in recess" (R. 102:13). 
In a minute entry entered the same day, the trial court noted, "Based upon 
information brought to the Court, the court sets aside defendant's plea in this matter. Plea 
is stayed pending a hearing in this matter" (R. 51-53). 
On August 23, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the matter (R. 103). When 
the prosecutor indicated, "Your Honor, I'm not entirely sure what the current status is. I 
just got a call Friday saying show up today," the court responded: 
The current status is is [sic] that on Friday the record will 
indicate that Mr. Rey de la Cruz Lopez entered a plea to two third 
degree felonies, forgery charges. It's been brought to the Court's 
attention—in fact, we discussed this at the time that the plea form 
itself was in English and not in Spanish. Mr. de la Cruz is not fluent 
in English. This form was translated for him, but based upon 
information the Court received, I have serious concerns that Mr. 
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Lopez understands the ramifications of what he is doing and what a 
plea to these charges means to him. 
(R. 103:2). Specifically, the court was concerned that "the plea here will eliminate the 
fact that he will be able to spend any time with his family for the rest of his life" (R. 
103:3). Thus, the court determined, "it might be appropriate for the Court to set aside his 
plea in this case and allow this matter to proceed" (R. 103:2-3). 
The State objected to the court's sua sponte motion, arguing that "it's the State's 
position that defendant did know what he was doing based upon [defense counsel's] 
representation and the Court's colloquy with the defendant," and that "[e]verybody knew, 
including the defendant, that the plea meant he would be deported" (R. 103:3). The State 
also questioned whether such deportation meant that defendant would not be able to see 
his family where he could either attempt to seek legal re-entry into the country or his 
family could visit him in Mexico (R. 103:3). 
Defense counsel confirmed that he had reviewed the plea agreement with 
defendant (R. 103:4). However, counsel differed from the State concerning whether 
defendant would ever be allowed to re-enter the country after his pleas (R. 103:4). Thus, 
although defendant "isn't sure what he wants to do in terms of allowing the Court to 
withdraw his guilty plea," counsel concluded that, "given the Court's concerns, it may be 
wise to have that reviewed by the defendant. I want to make sure that he understands the 
consequences" (R. 103:4, 6). 
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The State again objected "to reopening" defendant's pleas (R. 103:7). The trial 
court acknowledged the State's objections but ruled: 
I believe that based upon everything that has been brought to the 
Court's attention that Mr. Lopez was not fully informed in 
understanding—and had full understanding of the consequences of 
his act here, and I'm going to set aside his plea. 
(R. 103:7). 
The State filed a notice of appeal on September 21, 2004 (R. 69-70). The trial 
court entered a final order setting aside defendant's pleas on October 6, 2004 (R. 84-85). 
The State filed an amended notice of appeal on October 19, 2004 (R. 86-87). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the former statute governing withdrawal of guilty pleas, Utah's appellate 
courts held that a court lacks jurisdiction to consider motions to withdraw filed outside of 
the statutory thirty-day period. In 2003, the Legislature redefined the statutory period to 
expire upon announcement of sentence. Applying the prior law to the current statute, the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider its sua sponte motion to withdraw because it was 
made after sentence had already been announced. 
Alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside defendant's pleas 
because the court based its decision on concern that defendant may not have recognized 
all the collateral effects of his pleas. Under established case law, a defendant's lack of 
knowledge of the collateral consequences of a plea does not render that plea unknowing 
or involuntary. In any case, the record demonstrates that defendant was aware of those 
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collateral consequences when he entered his pleas. Finally, to the extent the court's 
decision rests upon non-record evidence, it is error. 
ARGUMENT 
L WHERE THE PLEA WITHDRAWAL STATUTE PROVIDES THAT 
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW MUST BE MADE BEFORE 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT LACKED 
JURISDICTION TO WITHDRAW DEFENDANT'S PLEAS ONCE 
SENTENCE WAS ANNOUNCED 
Under the statute governing withdrawal of pleas (the "plea withdrawal statute"), 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside defendant's pleas once it announced 
sentences on those pleas. Thus, this Court should vacate the trial court's order setting 
aside defendant's pleas. 
Before May 5, 2003, the plea withdrawal statute provided that "[a] request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest... shall be made within 30 days after the entry of 
the plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). In 1992, this Court held that the 30-
day time limit in the statute was jurisdictional. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 
(Utah App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 11, 31 
P.3d 528. The supreme court reached the same conclusion one year later. See State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (holding that once thirty-day 
statutory period expires, "the right [to move to withdraw a plea] is extinguished"). Thus, 
under the former statute, "[i]f a defendant [was] informed of the statute's thirty-day 
deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, section 77-13-6(2)(b) [was] 
jurisdictional." Price, 837 P.2d at 583; see also State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ffif 3-4, 40 
7 
P.3d 630; Ostler, 2001 UT 68, «|ffl 10-11 & n.3; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,126, 95 
P.3d 1203; State v. Afe/o, 2001 UT App 392,14, 40 P.3d 646; State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 
UT App 186,110, 5 P.3d 1222, abrogated on other grounds by State v. iteyey, 2002 UT 
13, ffij 3-4, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996). 
Effective May 2003, the Legislature amended the plea withdrawal statute to 
provide that "[a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest... shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion 
is denied." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). 
Having passed this amendment against the backdrop of Price, Abeyta, Reyes, and 
Ostler, the Legislature's clear intent was to redefine the jurisdictional period in which a 
trial court may consider a motion to withdraw. See Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 
P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1991) (noting "legislature is presumed aware of legal context in 
which it acts") (citing Hackfordv. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1284-85 
(Utah 1987)); State v. Hatch, 342 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Utah 1959) ("The Legislature is 
presumed to know the construction placed upon the language of the act. . . ")} 
]The Senate floor debates concerning the amendment are consistent with that 
intent. As Senator Gladwell explained in presenting the bill on the floor: 
The plain language of the statute currently states that [defendant's] 
must withdraw the plea within 30 days after the entry of the plea. It 
takes about six weeks from the time a person enters a plea until they 
are sentenced, so the statute has always anticipated that a person 
would enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily and then the plea 
would take effect prior to sentencing so that he couldn't withdraw it 
unless there was some showing of lack of voluntariness or that he 
didn't enter it knowingly. And of course, that's challenged from 
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Thus, if the defendant is given proper notice, the trial court's jurisdiction to 
withdraw a guilty plea now expires upon announcement of sentence. See State v. 
Helbach, 2004 UT App 388, \ 7 (Oct. 28, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding 
"trial court had no jurisdiction" to consider motion to withdraw filed after sentence was 
announced where statute "limits a defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea to the time 
before the announcement of sentence") (attached at Addendum B); see also State v. 
Peterson, 2004 UT App 456, \4 (Dec. 2, 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("The effect 
of section 77-13-6 is to grant a limited opportunity to withdraw a plea. If a motion to 
withdraw is not filed within the specified time frame, '[thereafter, the right is 
extinguished.'") (quoting Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995) (attached at Addendum B). 
In this case, defendant entered his guilty pleas on August 19, 2004, and asked to be 
sentenced immediately (R. 102:4-10). The trial court asked, "If you are sentenced today 
then you are giving up the right to file a request to withdraw this guilty plea. Did you 
discuss that with [counsel]?" (R. 102:11). Defendant responded, "Yes" (R. 102:11). The 
trial court then announced defendant's sentences, after which the court stated, "We'll be 
in recess" (R. 102:13). 
time to time. The supreme court in 2001 decided that the plain 
reading of the statute didn't make sense so they decided that what the 
statute really meant is that they had 30 days after entry of the 
sentence to withdraw the plea. The purpose of this bill, one of the 
purposes, is to clarify that a plea must be withdrawn before 
sentencing is announced, to kind of reinstate that earlier language. 
Tape 2 of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 56th Legislative, General Session (March 4, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Gladwell discussing H.B. 238). 
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At that point, under section 77-13-6, as amended, the trial court lost jurisdiction to 
consider any motion to withdraw defendant's pleas. See Helbach, 2004 UT App 388,17; 
see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13, fflf 3-4; Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ffi[ 10-11 & n.3; Abeyta, 852 
P.2d at 995; Smit, 2004 UT App 222, % 26; Afe/o, 2001 UT App 392, ^ 4; Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186,110; Canfield, 917 P.2d at 562; Price, 837 P.2d at 583. 
Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant its subsequent sua sponte 
motion to set aside defendant's pleas. This Court should therefore vacate the trial court's 
order and instruct the court to enter a final judgment consistent with defendant's pleas 
and the sentences announced thereon. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SUA SPONTE 
WITHDRAWING DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WHERE 
NOTHING IN THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS WERE UNKNOWING OR INVOLUNTARY 
The trial court erred in granting its sua sponte motion to withdraw defendant's 
guilty pleas because nothing in the record established, as required by statute, that 
defendant's pleas were unknowing or involuntary. 
Section 77-13-6(2)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] plea of guilty . . . may be 
withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). 
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f^ 7, 73 P.3d 985. However, 
whether the trial court applied the appropriate rale of law is reviewed for correctness. 
10 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 24, 55 P.3d 573. Moreover, an abuse of discretion 
occurs if the court's ruling is "based purely on 'unsupported generalizations and 
speculation.'" In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 835 & n.4 (Utah 1996). 
A. A defendant's ignorance of the collateral consequences of his 
pleas does not render those pleas unknowing or involuntary. 
Under authoritative Utah precedent, lack of knowledge about collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea, including those related to deportation, does not render that 
guilty plea unknowing or involuntary. Therefore, the trial court erred in setting aside 
defendant's pleas based on concerns that defendant may not have understood the 
deportation-related consequences of his pleas. 
In State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 892 
P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to withdraw his plea. Specifically, McFadden "argue[d] that his guilty plea was 
not entered voluntarily or knowingly since he did not know of the possibility that he 
might be deported . . . . " Id. 
In rejecting McFadden's claim, this Court first noted that '"[ajctual knowledge of 
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing 
and intelligent plea '" Id (quoting United States v. Campbell 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th 
Cir. 1965)). 
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This Court then noted that "[f]ederal courts have uniformly held that deportation is 
a collateral consequence of conviction and that the possibility of being deported does not 
affect the voluntariness of a guilty plea." Id. 
This Court was "persuaded by these federal authorities" and thus held, "as a matter 
of constitutional law, that the voluntariness of a plea is unaffected by collateral 
consequences such as possible deportation." Id. at 1305 & n.2; see also State v. Rojas-
Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, % 7, 73 P.3d 967 ("[A]n attorney's failure to inform a client 
of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness" where "deportation is a 'collateral consequence' of 
conviction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152 
(Utah 2003); El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 537 
U.S. 1024 (2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 535 U.S. 1070 (2002); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 
2000); United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 
F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. 1982); Michel v. United States, 507 
F.2d 461, 464-66 (2d Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 
(4th Cir. 1973); State v. Nguyen, 916 P.2d 689, 698 (Hawaii 1996); Commonwealth v. 
Hason, 545 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Mass. App. 1989); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 
1995); State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Cf. Broomes v. 
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Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 n. 4 (10th Cir.2004); Kandielv. United States, 964 F.2d 
794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992). 
The plea withdrawal statute and McFadden control the State's claim here. Under 
the plea withdrawal statute, a plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing that it was not 
knowing or voluntary. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Under McFadden, a 
defendant's lack of knowledge about the collateral consequences of his plea, including 
deportation-related consequences, does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. See 
McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304. Thus, lack of knowledge about the deportation-related 
consequences of a plea does not support withdrawal of that plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(a); McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304. Consequently, the trial court erred in setting 
aside defendant's pleas based on its concern that defendant did not understand those 
deportation-related consequences here. 
B. Even if ignorance of collateral consequences did establish an 
unknowing and involuntary plea, the record shows that 
defendant was aware of those consequences in this case. 
Even if ignorance of the deportation consequences of a plea could render a plea 
unknowing or involuntary, the trial court erred in withdrawing defendant's pleas because 
the record indicates that defendant was aware of those consequences here. 
As previously stated, the plea withdrawal statute provides that "[a] plea of guilty 
. . . may be withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); see also State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, 
110, 79 P.3d 960 (holding, under prior statute requiring showing of good cause before 
13 
plea could be withdrawn, that "[a] defendant can show good cause by putting forth 
evidence that the plea was in fact involuntary") (emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court set aside defendant's pleas based on "serious concerns 
that Mr. Lopez [misunderstands the ramifications of what he is doing and what a plea to 
those charges means to him" (R. 103:2). Specifically, the court was concerned that, 
because the plea agreement was written in English, not Spanish, defendant may not have 
understood that "the plea here will eliminate the fact that he will be able to spend any time 
with his family for the rest of his life" (R. 103:2-3). 
However, nothing in the record supports the trial court's concern that defendant did 
not understand the plea agreement. Rather, as the State argued during the trial court's 
hearing, the record establishes just the opposite. (See R. 102:7-8 (defendant confirming at 
plea hearing—at which defendant had the assistance of an interpreter—that, although the 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel was in 
English, not Spanish, his attorney had "[gone] through [the document] carefully with 
[him]"); R. 102:8 (defendant confirming at plea hearing that he had "[no] questions about 
what [he was] told by the interpreter about what that document says"); R. 102:8 (State 
noting that defense counsel "did take a fairly significant amount of time making sure his 
client did seem to understand the form"); R. 103:4 (defense counsel confirming "I did 
review the plea form with [defendant]"); R. 103:6 (second defense counsel stating "[w]e 
haven't got into the aspect as to whether or not he completely understood the guilty plea 
form")). 
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Moreover, neither the trial court nor defense counsel presented any evidence 
establishing or even suggesting that defendant would not be able to see his family again 
(R. 103:passim). Even assuming, as defense counsel did, that defendant's pleas would 
make it impossible for him to re-enter this country legally, the State noted without 
contradiction that, even if defendant were deported, nothing in defendant's pleas would 
stop his family from traveling to see him (See R. 103:3). 
Finally, even assuming that defendant's pleas would make it impossible for him to 
re-enter this country legally, neither the trial court nor defense counsel presented any 
evidence establishing that defendant was unaware of that consequence when he entered his 
pleas (R. 103:passim). The only evidence on that issue was the record of the plea hearing, 
which established that defendant was in fact aware of that possible consequence (See R. 
102:11 (court confirming that defendant understood "that if you are released to INS, then 
you are prohibited from coming back to this country if they deport you without their 
permission"). Thus, as the prosecutor argued in opposition to the trial court's sua sponte 
withdrawal motion, "[everybody knew, including the defendant, that the plea meant that 
he would be deported" (R. 103:3). 
In sum, the trial court's withdrawal of defendant's pleas was not based on record 
evidence. Rather, it was based on unidentified information "brought to the Court's 
attention," which was itself contradicted by the record (See R. 51-53 (court referring in 
minute entry after announcement of sentence to "information brought to the Court"); R. 
103:2 (court stating that "[i]t's been brought to the Court's attention" without indicating by 
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whom or how)) Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2 )(a) ( "A plea of guilty . . . may be 
withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.") 
(emphasis added). 
As such, the trial court's order constituted an abuse of discretion. See In re 
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 835 & n.4 (holding trial court abused its discretion where ruling 
was "based purely on 'unsupported generalizations and speculation""). Thus, this Court 
should vacate the trial court's order and instruct the court to enter a final judgment on 
defendant's pleas and the sentences announced thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to vacate the trial court's order 
setting aside defendant's guilty pleas and to order the trial court to enter a final judgment 
consistent with those pleas and the sentences announced by the court immediately after 
their entry. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2P_ January 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK-) 
Assistant Attorney General 
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea 
held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 
days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
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City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Aaron Helbach appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to be resentenced. This is before the 
court on the State's motion for summary disposition 
based on lack of jurisdiction. 
Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated 
robbery in August 2003. Helbach completed a 
statement in support of his guilty plea, giving the 
factual basis for his plea and waiving specific 
rights, including his right to appeal. The document 
also specified that he could withdraw his plea only 
on good cause shown, and that he must file a motion 
to withdraw his plea before the announcement of 
sentence. Helbach was sentenced in September 
2003. 
In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion for 
resentencing in the trial court in his criminal case. 
Helbach asserted that he was incompetent at the 
time of his plea, and thus the plea was invalid. The 
trial court denied the motion on its merits, finding 
there was no indication that Helbach was not fully 
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea, 
and that the mental evaluation from the State did 
not indicate any disorder that would impact his 
competency. The trial court also noted the motion 
was filed several months after sentencing, but did 
"not address [the] timeliness of the Motion." 
Helbach asserts that his motion was filed "under 
the philosophy" of State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 
63 P.3d 120, cert, granted, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003) 
, which permitted a defendant to file a motion for 
resentencing in the sentencing court under particular 
circumstances. Helbach has apparently seized on 
Rees to avoid going through the procedures for 
post-conviction relief as set forth in the Utah 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah Code 
sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), and Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65C. However, after Rees, this 
court has held that requests to be resentenced to 
permit a renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall 
squarely within rule 65C and the Act. See State v. 
Manning, 2004 UT App 87,f 21, 89 P.3d 196, 
cert granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 172(Utah Aug. 11, 
2004). 
Additionally, Helbach has not shown that he comes 
within the scope of Rees. In Rees, this court held 
that extraordinary relief may be available in the 
sentencing court if a defendant has been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees, 
2003 UT App 4 at TJ 6. Such relief, however, is 
available only in "limited circumstances, to modify 
or vacate a judgment where extra-record facts show 
that the defendant has been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial or meaningful 
appeal." Id. at U 13. Helbach waived his right to a 
trial and appeal by pleading guilty and does not 
come within the narrow scope of Rees. 
Instead, Helbach's motion is governed by Utah 
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Code section 77-13-6, providing for the methods of 
challenging a guilty plea. Section 77-13-6 provides 
that a guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). A request to withdraw a plea 
"shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced." Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant 
does not timely request to withdraw his plea, any 
challenge to the plea must be made pursuant to rule 
65C and the Act. See id. § 77-13-6(2)(c). 
*2 Helbach's motion requested resentencing, but 
attacked the validity of his plea, arguing he was 
incompetent. The trial court addressed the merits, 
finding that Helbach was not incompetent at his 
plea. The trial court also noted, but did not rule on, 
the late filing of the motion. In substance, Helbach's 
motion was a motion to withdraw his plea, and the 
trial court considered it as such. However, under 
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
consider the motion because it was made months 
after sentence was announced. Section 77-13-6 
limits a defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea 
to the time before the announcement of sentence. 
See id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). "Thereafter, the right is 
extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 
(Utah 1993) (holding that failure to file a timely 
motion for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The 
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea is 
jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,ffl[ 
3-4, 40 P .3d 630. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over Helbach's 
motion, and thus this court likewise lacks 
jurisdiction over this appeal. See State v. Montoya, 
825 P.2d 676, 678-79 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 
2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
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Joseph C. Peterson, Eloy, Arizona, Appellant Pro 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Joseph Peterson appeals the trial court's order 
summarily dismissing his petition for coram nobis. 
This is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition. 
Peterson pleaded guilty to a third degree felony 
charge in 1998. His sentence was suspended and he 
was put on probation. His probation terminated in 
June 2003. In July 2004, Peterson filed his petition 
for coram nobis alleging that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that his plea and 
conviction should be vacated. 
The petition was filed in the sentencing court under 
the same criminal case number rather than as a new 
case under rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The trial court could have considered 
the petition substantively as a motion to withdraw 
Peterson's plea, or as a post-conviction petition 
pursuant to rule 65C. The specific basis for the trial 
court's dismissal is unclear. It appears from the 
record, however, that Peterson's petition was 
procedurally barred whether construed as a 
post-conviction petition or as a motion to withdraw 
a plea. 
Pursuant to the version of Utah Code section 
77-13-6 in effect at the time of Peterson's plea, a 
motion to withdraw a plea must be made within 
thirty days after the entry of the plea. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1994). The effect of 
section 77-13-6 is to grant a limited opportunity to 
withdraw a plea. If a motion to withdraw is not filed 
within the specified time frame, "[thereafter, the 
right is extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
993, 995 (Utah 1993). If the trial court considered 
Peterson's petition as a motion to withdraw his plea, 
the trial court correctly dismissed the petition as 
untimely. 
Alternatively, if the trial court considered the 
petition as a post-conviction petition pursuant to the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), see Utah 
Code sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002), and rule 
65C, then Peterson's petition was also time barred. 
Under the Act, a defendant must file a petition 
within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l). A 
cause of action may accrue on "the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary 
facts on which the petition is based." Id. § 
78-35a-107(l)(e). Peterson filed his petition more 
than one year after his case was closed and his 
sentence terminated, and almost six years after his 
plea. He asserts that his claim is based on facts that 
were unknown to him. However, he does not 
provide dates or factual support for this assertion. 
Thus, Peterson has not alleged sufficient facts to 
show that he has timely filed his petition. 
Because Peterson's petition was untimely either as 
a post-conviction petition or as a motion to 
withdraw his plea, the trial court correctly dismissed 
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the petition. 
Accordingly, the dismissal of Peterson's petition is 
affirmed. 
2004 WL 2749489 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 456 
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